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“The first duty of anyone in captivity is to survive...the second duty is to escape. There is nothing more reprehensible to a human being than being placed behind bars or barbed wire, and there is something very human about wanting to break out.” Robert C. Doyle, A Prisoner’s Duty “Do not take counsel of your fears.” General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It In every war in which a nation is occupied by unfriendly powers there are invariably those people who are not willing to be subjugated through force or persuasion. This is the purpose of resistance; to defy the enemy through non-military means and prove that the spirit of the vanquished people is not dead, but still fighting. The Second World War was the largest war known to have ever been fought on Earth. Therefore, it follows that the level of resistance was higher than in any other war ever fought. Almost every theater of the war experienced some form of resistance. Despite initial compliance with the conquering Nazis, many European civilians felt they were being imprisoned in their own homelands, a condition many were unwilling to accept. While books and films have much romanticized the role of resistance forces in Europe, the fact is that “the Resistance” never really existed as an organized force. What did exist, however, were several well-organized and tightly-knit partisan groups which formed networks and pockets across the continent, each working in a separate and individual way to undermine the Nazi occupation. Resistance generally took three forms: intelligence, compliant subversion (also known as non-cooperation), and open resistance and sabotage. Each was important to the overall victory of Allied forces. Intelligence work was probably the most vital to the Allies, as resisters could often gain access to information Allied spies could never hope to infiltrate. In fact, one of the earliest documented resisters was “Source K,” a French telephone engineer who tapped Hitler’s main connection to Paris. The information he obtained was passed to Vichy officials working with Great Britain’s MI-6. Most of the Allies’ best intelligence sources were resisters who, like Source K, lived and worked within the occupied territories. Also falling under the intelligence category was the spread of anti-Nazi propaganda and “reverse” intelligence, that is, the provision of the resisters with information untainted by Nazi doctrine. This was accomplished not only by the maintenance of secret presses, but by radio contact as well. London especially became a major European media center, with several governments-in-exile broadcasting in their native languages to fellow countrymen stranded in the homeland. The Nazis in Norway were sufficiently perturbed by this to enforce a ban on possession of wireless radios. Compliant subversion was not an obvious form of resistance, but it was important nonetheless. Railway workers could easily foul up an entire German offensive by routing critical supplies to the wrong station or by striking during key Allied movements. “Go-slows,” worker-organized attempts to slow productivity at war-related factories, were not often damaging by themselves, but if four or five factories were involved, the results quickly added up. If each factory made five less tanks per week, only one less per working day, the result was the loss of about one hundred tanks in a one-month period. In perspective, such tactics could cost the Germans as many or more tanks than most early battles. Open resistance and sabotage were probably the most dangerous undertakings, because they were generally easy to trace and punishable by death. This did not deter thousands from joining armed guerrilla units such as Free France’s Armee Secrete and the communist Francs-Tireurs et Partisans. Sabotage hindered Axis versatility and forced German commanders to weigh carefully the balance of mobility and security. This was a major concern in mountainous areas. In his autobiography, Soldat: Reflections of a German Soldier, 1936-1949, Siegfried Knappe reports that during a counteroffensive move against the Allied landings in Italy, his horse artillery battalion was ordered to march across the Alps for fear that Italian partisans had mined the railway tunnels. It is interesting to note that the battalion traveled the same route used by Hannibal’s elephants centuries early. Because of limited supplies available to them, saboteurs quickly learned to destroy as efficiently as possible. Destroying a single telephone pole could foul up communications for hours, and more havoc could be wrought by stealing the wire for sale on the black market. The more efficient saboteurs found that corner poles were also harder to replace than those in a line. The key here is that every effort spent fighting guerrillas or repairing sabotage was that much effort not spent fighting the Allies at the front. Possibly the most famous resistance group of the war was the self-proclaimed “Free French.” Organized by Brigadier General Charles de Gaulle, the Free French operated in the French colonies to support the liberation of the French mainland. De Gaulle had been appointed undersecretary of national defense only ten days before the German invasion forced him to flee Paris. Smuggled to England, he established a government-in-exile, and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill proclaimed him “the leader of all free Frenchmen, wherever they may be, who rally to him in support of the Allied cause” [Bell 427]. With the financial support of Great Britain and the devotion of French colonials, de Gaulle led a successful attack on the Vichy French colony of Libreville, Gabon in the fall of 1940. When word of his success spread, Jean Moulin, representing three separate partisan groups in mainland France, met with de Gaulle in October 1941 to begin the process of welding the various factions into one identity. A massive smuggling operation soon came into existence, with the Allies receiving a source of reconnaissance and partisans getting weapons and radios, both in short supply to French guerrillas. This compromise was of major importance because most nations friendly to the Free French were unable to aid them with such supplies without some form of compensation due to their own war mobilization. De Gaulle’s dream of maintaining the French colonial empire thus served to feed the homeland with the supplies necessary to win the war which would cause the demise of all such systems. Some of de Gaulle’s greatest supporters in France were the French Communists. At first, Communist Party officials had discouraged anti-Nazi activity due to Hitler’s Non-Aggression Pact with the Soviet Union. After Hitler invaded Russia, however, the pact was void, and communists began a violent anti-Nazi campaign, fueled by Hitler’s own hatred of the Communist Party. The communist-based Front National became the only resistance group to operate in both Occupied and Vichy France. Also in de Gaulle’s assistance were thousands of Maquis, young men who had taken to the hills to avoid forced labor under the Germans. While some were merely trying to avoid serving the Nazis, many became powerful fighting units under the Armee Secrete and other militant partisan organizations. Their youthful vigor was important to their success, and these groups were responsible for much experimentation in new tactics. This broad-based support helped reinforce de Gaulle’s claim to the French seat of power, but winning control was not so simple. The Soviets recognized his French National Committee as the legitimate French government, but negotiations between the Allies and Vichy French officials threatened de Gaulle’s diplomatic power in the West. Vichy Marine Secretary Admiral Francois Darlan almost convinced Allied leaders to return Occupied France to Vichy control. Fortunately for de Gaulle and France, a French royalist (read that as “resister”) assassinated Darlan on Christmas Eve, 1942. After Operation Overlord, the FNC became the Committee For National Liberation. Because of the overwhelming support of the resistance groups, de Gaulle’s government was finally given control of northern France. This not only spared the northern French from being ruled by the cowed Vichy regime, it also freed up Allied leadership to concentrate on winning the war rather than managing a military government. This was in itself a huge help to the Allied war effort, and most likely de Gaulle’s greatest contribution to Hitler’s defeat. Though three forms of resistance have been identified, there existed a fourth which was classified variously as both intelligence and open resistance. This was the policy of escape and evasion. All across Europe was a network of “underground railroads” for downed airmen and “kriegies” (escapers were given this nickname from a shortened form of the German word for “prisoner of war”). The three most important routes were Comet, Shelburne, and an unnamed Italian line organized by a Catholic priest. Comet was the largest and most successful escape line. Escapers on this line were code-named “parcels,” and were passed like mail from Brussels, Belgium and points east to Paris, the Spanish border, Madrid, and, finally, the British naval base at Gibraltar. Over four thousand civilians were involved in this line, and about five hundred were caught and executed by the Nazis during the war. The operation was coordinated by MI-9’s Airey Neave. Neave himself was a famous escaper from Colditz Castle, a German prison camp reserved for the most dedicated escapers. Neave was one of only thirty kriegies to successfully escape from the prison. Shelburne was the route taken by the first successful American escaper, Lee, “Shorty” Gordon. Organized by Canadian Sergeant Major Lucien Dumais, it followed a much more direct route than Comet, going straight from Germany to Paris to a secret pick-up point on the English Channel from which the escapers were ferried to Falmouth, England. Possibly the most colorful character of the resistance, if not the war, was the Rt. Rev. Monsignor Hugh O’Flaherty, nicknamed “the Vatican Pimpernel.” Working independently, he established an escape line out of the Italian prison camps. In only nine months, O’Flaherty smuggled out nearly four thousand Allied soldiers, only one hundred twenty two of whom were recaptured. His astounding success brought him help from another MI-9 escaper, Lieutenant Colonel Sam Derry. Derry found himself working with an eccentric gambling man whose favorite hide-out was an apartment behind SS headquarters in Rome. He told Derry he had “Faith they’ll not look under their noses” [Doyle 146]. Of course, the objective of all escape routes, whether through France, Italy, Russia, the Balkans, or the Low Countries, was to prevent the recapture of the escaper. A valuable tool resisters used in this capacity was their ability to teach American soldiers how to be European. Such small mannerisms as cocking one’s hat or holding the fork in the right hand were inherently American, and could give one away to the Gestapo. This was also a prime reason resisters were more valuable than Americans or British as spies. Some resisters used this situation in reverse, however, and assumed there were things Americans should automatically know as well. Unidentified American escapers were asked questions about popular American culture, including baseball teams, film stars and comic strips. If they could not answer, they risked being shot as Gestapo agents. Altogether, resistance escape lines returned 35,000 soldiers to the ranks of the Allied armies, approximately the number of men needed to make up an infantry division, but this was not the only benefit of the escape lines. By making attempts to escape easier, the resisters encouraged more prisoners to attempt it. While escaping was punishable with no more than isolation, German commanders who routinely allowed prisoners to escape were not subject to such protection. Efforts to recapture escapers drained men and resources from the front line, yet another example of the small but valuable accomplishments of the resistance which wore down the Axis war machine. The drive to resist was not limited to the conquered territories. Many Germans opposed Hitler’s regime, and worked to destroy it from the inside. Die Weisse Rose and the Schwarze Kapelle are two prime examples of anti-Nazi groups within Germany. Die Weisse Rose was an underground student newspaper which was circulated at Munich University. It inspired a small student movement against the government, but this ended when the students behind the secret press were discovered by the university beadle. After he turned them over to Nazi authorities, they were executed to provide an example for any other students engaging in such treason. The Schwarze Kapelle was a group of German aristocrats, diplomats, and senior military officers who were very close to Hitler’s staff. They planned several attempts on his life, the most important being an operation named “Valkyrie.” Set for July 20th, 1944, the Valkyrie plan was organized by Colonel Claus Schenk von Stauffenberg. Von Stauffenberg planned to plant a bomb in Hitler’s desk and detonate it during a briefing of senior aides. Meanwhile, saboteurs were to cut communications lines to Berlin, giving the military officers in the group time to establish a new military regime. Unfortunately, Murphy’s Law was in full effect that day. The bomb was too small, the briefing was held elsewhere that day, and the sabotage operation had been botched, so any attempt to establish a new government would have been detected. Had the operation been successful, however, the possibilities for the new government are endless. Would the Schwarze Kapelle have sued for peace, or did they simply want to take power away from Hitler for their own gain? This was not the first attempt on Hitler’s life, nor was it the last. A similar bomb attack by Johann Georg Elser in 1939 failed only because Hitler left the beer hall where the bomb was planted about fifteen minutes before detonation. In fact, Hitler survived so many similar attacks, it would be ludicrous to attribute them all to chance. It seems possible that the Gestapo had sources deep inside the German resistance, but if so, this connection has not been revealed to date. The German resistance might have worked both ways, according to the Russians. Siegfried Knappe reports being interrogated by Russians as to plans for a Nazi underground in the event of German defeat: “There had, in fact, been talk of a guerrilla resistance, and apparently there had been some planning (the guerrillas were to be called ‘werewolves’), but as far as I knew, it had never come to anything” [Knappe 365]. It may be of importance here that some neo-Nazi groups in Europe today still use the term “werewolves” in their names. Some of the most tenacious resistance to Nazi rule was found in the Nordic nations. Norway maintained a strong underground anti-Nazi propaganda campaign throughout its occupation, fueled by one of the largest and best organized underground presses in Europe. This was spurred by the need to support Milorg, Norway’s official Home Forces, following the ban of wireless radios by the Norwegian puppet government. Milorg was responsible for smuggling British arms and instructors into Norway to support the largely unarmed resistance forces. One notable vestige of this underground press is the symbol “H7,” a sign of support for the deposed Norwegian king Haakon VII which rivaled de Gaulle’s double-armed cross as an icon of the resistance. Related to this is a poem distributed in the country which praised the Nazi regime in German, but formed an English acrostic reading “God Save The King.” The Norwegian teacher’s association also mounted a successful non-cooperation campaign by refusing to teach Nazi doctrine in their classrooms. The plans of the Norwegian Nazi leader for a “State Assembly” were ruined by the gross antipathy of the people towards the government, prompting his May 1942 outburst, “It is you teachers who are to blame...!” [Roberts 945]. Both Poland and Denmark also maintained government-sanctioned resistance forces during the occupation, and both were instrumental in the defeat of the Nazi regimes in their respective nations. The Polish resistance was organized at least as well as, if not more than, de Gaulle’s French forces. Drawing from both civilian and military recruitments, the Polish Home Army sabotaged enemy military production and transportation, organized armed revolts, and established the “Underground State,” including underground courts to protect the Polish Jews and clandestine schools and universities to avoid Nazi assimilation. The Danish Milorg managed a small but striking blow to Hitler’s “Final Solution.” Milorg learned of the planned date for the arrest of the Danish Jews and arranged to have most of them smuggled to neutral Sweden before the roundup could happen. Fewer than 500 Danish Jews were captured by the Nazis. [Roberts 946] The Dutch resistance became skilled at non-cooperation, due the impossibility of a large-scale armed revolt in their tiny nation. Three mass strikes occurred, the most important one during the Allies’ Operation Market-Garden. This strike frustrated German attempts to mobilize units in Holland for a counteroffensive, and received a harsh reprisal. While Dutch resistance was often more costly to the Dutch than to the Nazis, it inspired a strong sense of nationalism in the country. No reprisal, however, could match the sheer brutality of that imposed by the Nazis for the murder of General Reinhard Heydrich, head of the SS, in Czechoslovakia in 1942. Two Czech nationals, after escaping to Great Britain at the outset of the war, returned to their homeland in December 1941 with the express purpose of assassinating the man considered most responsible for the atrocities of the Nazi elite forces. The two men gained the support of local resisters and began observing Heydrich’s routine. On May 27th, 1942, they ambushed his open sedan as it turned a street corner in Holesovice. They escaped the scene, but left much evidence in their wake, including a stolen bicycle. The manhunt was intense, and when Heydrich died of his injuries nine days later, the retribution was more than doubled. To set an example for the native populace, the SS murdered the entire male population of the small town of Lidice, which had had no connection with the assassins whatsoever. The remaining population was sent to concentration camps, where most of the women died as well. The entire town was then bulldozed under and replanted with grass. To the casual observer, the town might never have existed, for no trace of it was left remaining. Other atrocities committed in the name of Heydrich’s avenging include the execution of the stolen bicycle’s owner and her family, as well as the families of the as-yet-unapprehended suspects and about fifteen hundred others with only the most intangible connections to the resistance. In the end, the Czech assassins were betrayed by two turncoat resisters. The assassins were cornered in a Prague church along with five other parachutists. The resolve of the seven men was unequaled; they held off several wave attacks by SS troops and countered attempts to bring them out by tear gas, smoke, grenades and water, tying up what amounted to an entire battalion of SS soldiers, generally considered the Nazi elite. Finally, however, the five who were not killed in the fighting committed suicide with their last bullets to avoid interrogation and death at the hands of the Nazi officials. The death of Heydrich was a major coup for both the Czech resistance and the Allies. As both the head of the SS and Reichsprotector of Czechoslovakia, Heydrich was one of the highest Nazi officials to die at the hands of the resistance. (Benito Mussolini, the fascist dictator and, according to some, Nazi puppet, of Italy, was also killed by partisans following the fall of Rome.) It was an inspirational victory for the Czechs, who had been essentially unvictorious since the Nazis had taken control of the Sudetenland in 1939. But what do all of these anecdotes of resistance mean? Certainly they are powerful sketches of human courage under duress, but in the larger sense, they truly revealed the fundamental flaw in the Nazi government. “They did not comprehend that when they ground... resistance into the dust, they also ground in the very seeds of the resistance they sought to destroy” [Burgess 237]. The resistance effort, with its thousands of small victories both documented and forgotten, slowed the Axis more and more every day it existed. Information from resistance spies was, in many cases, the only intelligence available to the Western Allies in the early stages of the war. Underground presses kept hope alive in the occupied countries. Go-slows undermined German production even as American production was rising to meet it. Thousands risked and often lost their lives pinning down Hitler’s soldiers in guerrilla attacks and saboteur strikes. But the inestimable value of the resistance lay not only in what it did to the Nazis, but also in what it did to the Europeans. Bound by a common sense of survival and escape, that “very human” desire to break free, the resistance prepared Europeans for the establishment of peace and cooperation which followed the war and overcame the regional animosities which had hobbled a lasting peace since the time of the Romans. This reconciliation of centuries of conflict was, after all, the real victory of the Allied nations in the Second World War. Bibliography Primary Sources: Knappe, Siegfried. Soldat: Reflections of a German Soldier, 1936-1949, New York, NY: Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 1992. Patton, George S., Jr. War As I Knew It, New York, NY: Bantam Books, 1980. Secondary Sources: Bell, P.M.H. “Gaulle, Brig-General Charles de,” The Oxford Companion to World War II, Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1995. Burgess, Alan. Seven Men at Daybreak, New York, NY: Bantam Books, Inc., 1983. Doyle, Robert C. A Prisoner’s Duty, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Foot, M.R.D. & Roberts, Adam. “Resistance,” The Oxford Companion to World War II, Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1995. Foot, M.R.D. “Subversive Warfare,” The Oxford Companion to World War II, Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1995. Kedward, Roderick. “France,” The Oxford Companion to World War II, Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1995. Sword, Keith. “Poland,” The Oxford Companion to World War II, Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1995. |
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